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Abstract:. The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of 
first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency 
and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as 
components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our 
experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. 
After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it will focus on 
the sense of agency for a given action, understood as the sense the agent has that he or she 
is the author of that action. I argue that the sense of agency can be analyzed as a compound 
of more basic experiences, including the experience of intentional causation, the sense of 
initiation and the sense of control. I further argue that the sense of control may itself be 
analysed into a number of more specific, partially dissociable experiences. 
 
1. Introduction 
Until quite recently, the phenomenology of action received surprisingly little attention 
from both action theorists and theorists of consciousness. Things are starting to change, 
however. In particular, improving psychological and neuroscientific methods have now 
made the phenomenology of agency an object of empirical investigation. One of the 
earlier pioneers was certainly Libet whose famous studies on the 'readiness potential' 
were interpreted by many, including Libet himself, as evidence in favor of a skeptical 
attitude towards conscious mental causation. More recently, Wegner's psychological 
experiments and his claim that the conscious will is an illusion also promoted what Bayne 
and Levy (2006) aptly call 'will-skepticism'. These attacks on the traditional view of the 
structure of agency and the role the experience of agency plays within this structure did 
much to reawaken the interest of philosophers in the phenomenology of agency. At the 
same time, further empirical investigations aimed at probing in more detail the 
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phenomenology of agency and its disorders have started yielding a wealth of new data, 
suggesting that the current strand of will-skepticism may rest in part on too simplistic a 
view of the phenomenology of agency.  
The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of 
first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of 
agency and makes it manifest that the experience of agency includes many other 
experiences as components. Yet, it remains unclear how these various aspects of the 
phenomenology of agency are linked, to what extent they are dissociable, and whether 
some are more basic than others. It also remains unclear what their sources are and how 
exactly they relate to action specification and action control mechanisms.  
In this paper, my focus will be on one essential dimension of the phenomenology 
of doing, namely the sense of agency. The sense of agency for a given action; i.e. the 
sense the agent has that he or she is the author of that action, can, I shall argue, be 
analyzed as a compound of more basic experiences. Most prominent among these 
component experiences are the experience of intentional causation, the sense of initiation 
and the sense of control. I will further argue that the sense of control may itself be 
analysed into a number of more specific, partially dissociable experiences. It may 
therefore take different, stronger or weaker forms, depending on what, in a given 
instance, its sources are and on their degree of congruence. 
I shall start by laying out some central assumptions regarding the relation of the 
phenomenology of agency to action specification and action control mechanisms that 
guide the approach pursued in this paper (section 2). I will then propose a preliminary 
regimentation of the various components of the phenomenology of agency (section 3). 
After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action (section 4), I 
will turn to the sense of agency (section 5). I will discuss some approaches to the sense of 
agency one finds in the recent literature and explore the contributions the sense of 
intentional causation, the sense of initiation and the sense of control make to the general 
sense of agency, their possible relations to different aspects and stages of the processes of 
action specification and control, and the different forms the sense of agency may take as a 
result of their combined contributions. 
2. Working assumptions 
The approach I will pursue in order to get a better understanding of the phenomenology 
of agency relies on a set of assumptions that need to be made explicit. My key 
assumption is that the processes through which the phenomenology of agency is 
generated have strong connections with the processes involved in action specification and 
control. More specifically, the latter processes have a causal/teleological quality in the 
sense that representations of action goals cause general preparation, then progressive 
specification, then physical movement. The component representations that lead to action 
evolve over measurable time, and can be distinguished from each other by the time of 
their activation as well as their functional and content properties. Finally, these 
component representations are differentially accessible to consciousness, and the source 
of different varieties of conscious experience all linked to action. 
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As I have argued elsewhere (Pacherie, 2000, 2003, 2006), three main stages can be 
distinguished in the process of action specification, corresponding to the formation of 
future-directed intentions (F-intentions), present-directed intentions (P-intentions) and 
motor intentions (M-intentions). F-intentions are formed before the action and represent 
the whole action as a unit. They are usually detached from the situation of action and 
specify types of actions rather than tokens. Their content is therefore conceptual and 
descriptive. F-intentions are also, as Bratman (1987) points out, subject to distinctive 
normative pressures for consistency and coherence: in particular, they should be means-
end coherent, consistent with the agent's beliefs and consistent with other intentions he or 
she may have. P-intentions serve to implement action plans inherited from F-intentions. 
They anchor the action plan both in time and in the situation of action and thus effect a 
transformation of the descriptive contents of the action plan into perceptual-actional 
contents constrained by the present spatial as well as non-spatial characteristics of the 
agent, the target of the action, and the surrounding context. The final stage in action-
specification involves the transformation of the perceptual-actional contents of P-
intentions into sensorimotor representations (M-intentions) through a precise 
specification of the spatial and temporal characteristics of the constituent elements of the 
selected motor program.  
Another essential element of this framework is the idea that the representations 
formed at each of these three levels play a continuing role in the guidance and control of 
the ongoing action.1 Of course, the guidance and control exercised at each level take 
rather different forms. As work in the area of motor control shows, for precise and 
smooth execution movements need to be controlled at the sensorimotor level. According 
to a very influential theoretical framework, motor control is achieved through the use of 
internal models (Jordan & Wolpert, 1999; Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 
2000; Wolpert, 1997; Jeannerod, 1997; Frith et al., 2000). The two main kinds of internal 
models are forward and inverse models. Forward models (also called predictive models) 
mimic or represent the causal flow of a process in a system and use it to predict the next 
state of that system. Inverse models (or controllers) inverse the causal flow of a system 
(hence their name): given a desired outcome and the current state of a system, they work 
out the commands that would produce the desired outcome. In motor control, inverse 
models capture the relationships between intended sensory consequences and the motor 
commands yielding those consequences. They are computational systems, which take as 
their inputs representations of (a) the current state of the organism (b) the current state of 
its environment and (c) the desired state and yield as their outputs motor commands for 
achieving the desired state. In contrast, the task of forward models is to predict the 
sensory consequences, both interoceptive and exteroceptive, of the execution of motor 
commands. Of special interest is the idea that the control of movement depends in a large 
part on the coupling of inverse and forward models through a series of comparators that 
compare various signals representing desired, predicted and actual states and use the 
result of the comparison for various kinds of regulation. For instance, discrepancies 
between the predicted and actual consequences of the execution of a movement can be 
used to instantly adjust the ongoing movement. These processes of online motor control 
are very fast. The sensorimotor format of the representations they exploit and their 
temporal properties make it doubtful whether their contents could in principle be 
accessible to consciousness. 
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In contrast, the higher-level guidance and control functions exercised at the level 
of P-intentions and F-intentions typically take a conscious form. They are involved in the 
rational and the situational control of action, supporting control processes responsible for 
keeping track of the way the agent accomplishes her action and adjust it so as to 
maximize her chances of success (tracking control) and to minimize undesirable side-
effects (collateral control).2 Here, the main difference between P-intentions and F-
intentions is that the former exercize tracking and collateral control of the action with 
regard to the situation as currently perceived, whereas the latter are concerned with the 
respect of more global consistency and coherence constraints.  
Thinking of the control of action in terms of internal models has proven very 
fruitful. Although the main in-depth application of this idea has been to fine-grained 
aspects of motor control, corresponding to the level of M-intentions, there is no good 
reason why the idea of internal models shouldn't be used in thinking about more global 
aspects of action specification. Presumably, the deliberative processes at work at the level 
of F-intentions make use of internal models of the world — both general theories such as 
folk-physics, folk-biology of folk-psychology and more specialized bodies of knowledge 
— as well as of the self-model the agent has of her desires, values, general policies and 
rules of conduct. Of course, the kinds of models exploited at this level have little to do 
with the internal models of the dynamics or kinematics of the motor apparatus. The 
contents represented at the level of F-intentions as well as the format in which these 
contents are represented and the computational processes that operate on them are 
obviously rather different from the contents, representational formats and computational 
processes operating at the level of M-intentions. Yet, the general idea that internal models 
divide into inverse models which compute the means towards a given goal and forward 
models which compute the consequences of implementing these means retains its validity 
at the level of F-intentions. And so does the idea that specifying an action plan and 
monitoring its execution rely on the coupling of inverse and forward models.  
Similarly, it is highly plausible that action-specification at the level of P-
intentions makes use of internal models and that these internal models differ from both F-
level and P-level internal models. On the one hand, as we have seen, the role of P-
intentions is to anchor an action plan in a given situation of action and to select an 
appropriate action program. To play that role, they have to integrate a broad range of both 
conceptual and perceptual information about the current situation of the agent, the current 
goal and the context of action to yield a situated action plan, more specific than the 
typically rather abstract action plan formed at the level of F-intentions. On the other hand, 
the representational resources available at the level of P-intentions are richer than the 
representational resources used by M-intentions and include information about 
conceptual or non-spatial perceptual properties of the situation not available to M-
intentions.3 
I therefore suggest that the information-processing model of action control in 
terms of internal models be explicitly combined with the threefold distinction among 
kinds of intentions I tried to motivate, thus yielding a richer theoretical framework for 
thinking about action. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the view of action 
specification and control that results from this combination. 
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Figure 1: A hierarchical model of action specification. The top level, in yellow, 
corresponds to F-intentions, the middle level in green to P-intentions, the level in 
blue to M-intentions, and the level in pink to actual execution. 
 
What I now want to explore is the idea that some at least of these information-processing 
events may have phenomenal counterparts and that it may be possible to identify links 
between conscious experiences during voluntary action and action-specification 
processes by considering their respective contents and temporal properties. Although, I'll 
briefly discuss other aspects of the phenomenology of agency, my main focus will be on 
the experience of control. 
3. A preliminary regimentation 
Both philosophical and empirical investigations highlight the fact that the 
phenomenology of agency has many facets. A non-exhaustive list of proposed 
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distinctions includes awareness of a goal, awareness of an intention to act, awareness of 
initiation of action, awareness of movements, sense of activity, sense of mental effort, 
sense of physical effort, sense of control, experience of authorship, experience of 
intentionality, experience of purposiveness, experience of freedom, and experience of 
mental causation. This profusion raises several questions: how are these various aspects 
of the phenomenology of agency related? To what extent are they are dissociable? Are 
some more basic than others? Where does their content come from? How exactly do they 
relate to action specification and action control mechanisms? 
Let me start with some distinctions and a preliminary regimentation of these 
facets of the phenomenology of action based on what their content is about.  
One first distinction is between physical actions and mental actions and their 
respective phenomenology. Typically, physical actions involve the production of causal 
effects in the external world through movements of the body of the agent, while mental 
actions, such as attending to something or trying to remember the name of the person, 
don't. Here I will focus on the phenomenology of physical actions, an important element 
of which is a sense of oneself as a physical agent producing physical effects in the world 
via its bodily interactions with it.  
A second important distinction is between a long-term sense of agency and an 
occurrent sense of agency. The former may be thought to include both a sense of oneself 
as an agent apart from any particular action, i.e. a sense of one's capacity for action over 
time, and a form of self-narrative where one's past actions and projected future actions 
are given a general coherence and unified through a set of overarching goals, motivations, 
projects and general lines of conduct.4 The latter is the sense of agency one experiences at 
the time one is preparing or performing a particular action. 
A third distinction is between detached and immersed awareness. Immersed 
awareness is the kind of non-reflective experience one has when one is fully engaged in 
an activity, while detached awareness requires a form of reflective consciousness, where 
the agent, so to speak, mentally steps back and observes himself acting or introspects 
what he is doing. Detached awareness can take at least two forms: a 'third-person' form 
where the detachment consists in the agent adopting the third-person stance of an external 
observer towards his own activity and a 'first-person' form where the agent introspects the 
thoughts and experiences he has while preparing and performing an action. In what 
follows, I'll be mostly concerned with what Marcel (2003), who draws similar 
distinctions, calls a minimal sense of agency, that is a sense of agency that is both 
occurrent and immersed. 
Yet, even this minimal sense of agency is not something monolithic; it includes a 
number of distinguishable aspects. One way to draw these distinctions is in terms of the 
component elements of the content of our awareness of our current actions. First, some 
aspects of the phenomenology of agency concern the action itself, what is being done, 
while others concern the agent of the action, her awareness that she is acting or that she is 
the agent of the action. The former aspects, constituting what we may call awareness of 
action, themselves subdivide into what and how, i.e. awareness of the goal pursued and 
awareness of the means employed to attain this goal. The latter aspects of the 
phenomenology of agency, the sense of agency proper, may itself be subdivided into a 
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sense of intentionality or intentional causation, a sense of initiation and a sense of control. 
Note that this preliminary regimentation is not meant to preempt the question whether 
these various aspects are dissociable or not, for instance whether we can be aware of what 
we are doing independently of an awareness of how we're doing it or whether we can be 
aware of what we are doing without at the same time experiencing this action as ours.  
Let us now move forward and examine how these component elements of the 
content of the phenomenology of agency relate to one another and how they could relate 
to component representations built at various stages of the process of action-specification. 
4. Awareness of action  
4.1. What 
Actions have a goal and typically the phenomenology of doing involves an element of 
purposiveness. In other words, we are aware to some degree of what we are doing. 
According to the model of action specification described earlier, the goal of an action can 
be specified at three levels. When the action is preceded by deliberation and we have an 
F-intention, we can be conscious of an intended goal prior to any situational anchoring 
and independently of the actual performance of the action. To take a very simple 
example, I might form the intention to get a drink of water and be aware of that goal. At 
this level, the goal is represented in a rather abstract and coarse-grained way, as a goal of 
a certain type or belonging to certain semantic category, for instance drinking as opposed 
to eating, or drinking water as opposed to soda or milk.  
That we can be aware of an intended goal as represented in the content of a F-
intention doesn't mean that the experience of purposefulness always takes that form. For 
one thing, actions are often performed without prior deliberation and without being 
preceded by F-intentions. Another common occurrence is the phenomenon of lost 
intentions. I may find myself in the kitchen wondering why on earth I went there. Yet, my 
inability to remember that I intended to get a glass of water is not enough to completely 
undermine a sense of purposiveness for my action. Presumably, the experience one has in 
such a case is rather different from the experience of a sleepwalker suddenly awakened 
who finds himself in his kitchen. It may be that our familiarity with such slips of 
intentions leads us to infer the existence of an initial purpose and that this in turn helps us 
retain a sense of purposefulness for the action.  
It may also be that that our sense of purposiveness in the case of actions 
performed without being preceded F-intentions or in the case of slips of intentions derives 
in part from our awareness of the goal as it is represented at the level of P-intentions. At 
this level the goal is represented in a more specific way, not just semantically but 
indexically, not just for instance as "to get a drink of water" but as "to reach for this glass 
of water". We are usually aware of our situated goal both immediately prior to action 
initiation and while the action unfolds. Thus, although I may have forgotten why I wanted 
to go to the kitchen, I may still be aware that I wanted to go to the kitchen. In other 
words, one can lose sight of one's overarching goal, while remaining aware of one's 
immediate situated goal, which in the example considered here, happens to be a subgoal 
to the overarching goal of getting a drink. I'll say more below on the relationship between 
goals at the level of F-intentions and goals at the level of P-intentions. The point for now 
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is simply that the sense of purposiveness for an action may be linked to awareness of the 
goal at the level of P-intentions rather than, or in addition to, awareness of the goal at the 
level of F-intentions.  
We are often but not always aware of the situated goal of our actions. To take a 
well-rehearsed example, in highly routine or automatic actions, such as driving a car, one 
may more or less automatically respond to stimuli in the environment without being 
aware (or while being only marginally aware) of what we are doing. Some of our goals 
may be explicitly conscious but not salient, say taking a left turn after the gas station 
when following a well-known route; some may not be explicitly conscious at all, such as 
slowing down before a curve or shifting gears. Yet, they can be principle become 
explicitly conscious. This happens, for instance, in case of action failure. If we apply the 
brakes because the truck in front of us is slowing down or turn the wheel to take a curve 
and the car doesn't respond, we may suddenly become aware of what we were trying to 
do. 
It is unclear whether we can be aware of our instantaneous motor goals, as they 
are implemented in a sensori-motor format. F-intentions, P-intentions and M-intentions 
employ different representational formats and the representations at these levels have 
different temporal properties. It is therefore possible that the representational format of 
M-intentions is incommensurable with the representational format or formats of our 
phenomenology or that M-intentions are too short-lived to be accessible to consciousness. 
One line of evidence in favor of incommensurability comes from the study of patients 
with optic ataxia. For instance, the patient DF, studied by Milner an Goodale (1995) was 
unable to recognize everyday objects, to visually identify simple shapes or to tell whether 
two visual shapes were the same or different. Yet her visuomotor abilities were intact. 
When asked to pick up an object, she shaped her hand optimally for the grip, and when 
asked to post a card through a slit, she oriented the card correctly. The co-existence in 
such patients of impaired conscious visual perception and preserved visuomotor abilities 
suggests that visuomotor representations are need not be derived from conscious visual 
perceptions but can be built independently. Conversely, it also suggests that conscious 
visual representations cannot be derived from intact sensori-motor representations. 
Yet, as Wakefield and Dreyfus point out: ‘Although at certain times during an 
action we may not know what we are doing, we do always seem to know during an action 
that we are acting, at least in the sense that we experience ourselves as acting rather than 
as being passively moved about’ (1991: 268). It seems that even when awareness of 
action reduces to the sense that we are acting and does not include an awareness of what 
we are doing, a minimal sense of purposiveness is retained despite the specific goal of the 
action not being conscious itself. I suggest that M-intentions may still be responsible both 
for this basic aspect of action phenomenology, that-experience, and for the minimal sense 
of purposiveness that tinges it.  
As we have seen, motor control involves mechanisms of action anticipation and 
correction. Although, these mechanisms largely operate at the subpersonal level, in the 
sense that the representations they process are typically unavailable to consciousness, 
they may nevertheless underlie the experience of acting in its most basic form. In other 
words, our awareness that we are acting, the sense of bodily implication we experience 
may result from the detection by the comparison mechanisms used in motor control of a 
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coherent sensory-motor flow. It is important to note that on this view, the basic 
experience that one is acting need not involve conscious access to the contents of the 
sensorimotor representations used for the control of the ongoing action but only to the 
result of the comparisons between intended, predicted and actual states. That is why, as 
Wakefield and Dreyfus remark, we may experience ourselves as acting without knowing 
what it is exactly we are doing. That is also why the representational content of the 
experience of acting may appear so thin. This is especially so when one is engaged in 
'minimal' actions, actions that are performed routinely, automatically, impulsively or 
unthinkingly. These actions unfold with little or no conscious control by P-intentions. 
Their phenomenology may therefore involve nothing more than the faint phenomenal 
echo arising from coherent sensory-motor flow.  
In a nutshell, I suggest that the sense of purposiveness that forms part of the 
awareness of actions has three main sources: awareness of the goal of the action as 
specified at the level of F-intention, awareness of the situated goal as specified at the 
level of P-intentions, basic sense of doing that arises from a comparison of intended, 
predicted and actual states at the level of M-intentions. The sense of purposiveness 
accompanying an action can be thinner or thicker depending on how many of these 
sources contribute in a given case and how much they do. For instance, although the goal 
of an action as represented at the level of F- and P-intentions is in principle accessible to 
consciousness, it may not be explicitly conscious at a given time if attention is focused 
elsewhere, the agent is distracted, or the action is routine and automatic.  
4. 2. How 
Beyond being aware of what we are doing, in the sense of being aware of the goal of our 
action, we may also have some awareness of our specific manner of bringing about this 
desired result. Let us call this aspect of the awareness of action how-awareness. In the 
same way that in the process of action specification, there are three different stages of 
goal specification, there are also three different stages of means specification. Very 
schematically, at the more abstract level of F-intentions, means are typically represented 
as subgoals or subactions; at the level of P-intentions they are represented as movements 
of a certain type; finally, at the level of M-intentions they are represented as fully 
specified movements. Once again, we must ask which of these representations of means 
are accessible to consciousness and what they contribute to our how-awareness for our 
current actions.  
But let me start with some remarks on the notion of basic actions. As argued by 
Hornsby (1980), one should at least distinguish between a causal notion of basicness and 
an intentional (or teleological) notion of basicness. Hornsby offers the following 
definition of causal basicness:  
A description d of a particular action a is a more basicC description than another 
description d' if the effect that is introduced by <d, a> causes the effect that is 
introduced by <d', a>. (1980: 71).  
While her notion of teleological or intentional basicness runs as follows:  
PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ 
PSYCHE 2007: VOLUME 13 ISSUE 1 10 
The kinds of actions in an agent's repertoire that are basic for him are those which 
he knows how to do, and knows how to do otherwise than on the basis of knowing 
how they are done by him (1980: 84) 
Three important features of this latter definition are worth stressing. First, the idea of an 
intentionally basic action is related to that of know-how. Second, knowing how to do 
something should not be taken to imply that one possesses theoretical knowledge of how 
it is done. This know-how should be considered as immediate, that is non-mediated by a 
theoretical knowledge of how it is done. In other words, it is practical and not theoretical 
know-how. Third, Hornsby’s notion of intentionally basic action is relativized to 
individual agents. Thus, for example, executing a trill may be a basic action for a 
professional pianist, but not for a novice piano player.  
One important reason for drawing a distinction between these two notions of basic 
actions is that causal basicness and intentional basicness do not always go hand in hand. 
For instance, if a man raises his right arm, 'contracting such and such muscles' will be a 
description of his action that is causally more basic than 'raising his arm', but, unless 
perhaps the man is a yogi or an expert body-builder, contracting his muscles is not 
something on which he will have direct voluntary control and thus the description of his 
action as 'raising his arm' will be intentionally more basic than the description 
'contracting such and such muscles'. 
My reasons for drawing attention to this distinction will shortly become apparent. 
Returning to the issue of how-awareness, it is important to note that what counts as 
means vs. goal is level-dependent. What counts as means at the level of F-intentions are 
typically the subgoals in achieving the goal and these subgoals are represented in an 
abstract, semantic way. When the F-intention is for a familiar action, say, going to work, 
we frequently don’t need to explicitly consider the means to achieve this and as a result 
lack explicit awareness of the subgoals towards achieving our goal, even though they are 
in principle accessible to consciousness. Importantly, when moving from F-intentions to 
P-intentions and reaching a further, finer-grained, stage in the specification of action, 
these subgoals that are treated as means at the level of F-intentions become immediate 
situated goals while means correspond to ways of implementing these goals, the selected 
motor programs and the types of movements or movement sequences they define.  
So to what extent are we aware of our bodily movements? Awareness of 
movements appear to be modulated both by the intentional basicness of the action for the 
agent and by the degree of causal basicness of the action. Typically, agents have little or 
no awareness of how they accomplish actions that are basic for them and have little 
awareness of the details of their movements beyond their more global parameters. For 
instance, I am normally aware that I am raising my arm to reach for the cookie jar on the 
top shelf of the cupboard but have little or no awareness of how I raise my arm. 
In a series of experiments, Jeannerod and co-workers (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 
1998; Slachewsky et al., 2001) investigated subjects' awareness of their movements. 
Subjects were instructed to draw lines in the sagittal direction to a visual target with a 
stylus on a digital tablet. They couldn't see their hand, only the trajectory of the stylus 
was visible as a line on a computer screen, superimposed on the hand movement. A 
directional bias (to the right or to the left) was introduced electronically, such that the 
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visible trajectory no longer corresponded to that of the hand, and the bias was increased 
from trial to trial. In order to reach the target, the hand-held stylus had to be moved in a 
direction opposite to the bias. In other words, although the line on the computer screen 
appeared to be directed to the target location, the hand movement was directed in a 
different direction. At the end of each trial, subjects were asked in which direction they 
thought their hand had moved by indicating the line corresponding to their estimated 
direction on a chart presenting lines oriented in different directions. 
These experiments revealed several important points. Subjects accurately 
corrected for the bias in tracing a line that appeared visually to be directed to the target. 
When the bias was small, this resulted from an automatic adjustment of their hand 
movements in a direction opposite to the bias. Subjects tended to ignore the veridical 
trajectory of their hand in making a conscious judgment about the direction of their hand. 
Instead, they adhered to the direction seen on the screen and based their report on visual 
cues, thus ignoring non-visual (e.g., motor and proprioceptive) signals.5 The general idea 
suggested by this result is that when biases remain small enough the visuomotor system is 
able to appropriately use information for producing accurate corrections to reach a target, 
but that this information is not accessed consciously. However, when the bias exceeded a 
mean value of about 14 degrees, subjects changed strategy and began to use conscious 
monitoring of their hand movement to correct for the bias and to reach the target. Yet, 
even though they consciously noticed the discrepancy between what they were doing and 
what they saw on the screen, subjects experienced their movements either as 
underestimates of their actual deviation or in the opposite direction to their actual 
adjusted movements. This transition from automatic to conscious control can be 
interpreted in at least two ways. According to Jeannerod and colleagues, when the 
discrepancy between the seen trajectory and the felt trajectory becomes too large to be 
automatically corrected, subjects become aware of it and use conscious compensation 
strategies. An alternative interpretation is that the change of strategy doesn't result from 
the conscious detection of a large discrepancy between visual and proprioceptive 
information but from the detection of a large discrepancy between predicted visual state 
and actual visual state. More precisely, the ongoing failure of the automatic control 
system to correct errors would result in control being passed back to the level of P-
intentions in effect sending it a message of the form 'something is wrong'. Conscious 
detection of error would then be the result of a comparison of predicted visual state and 
actual visual state at the level of P-intentions.6 
One reason for preferring this alternative interpretation comes from the even more 
striking results of Marcel's vibro-tactile experiments (Marcel, 2003). By vibrating the 
biceps tendon at the elbow at certain frequencies, one can induce a reflex movement of 
the arm. If this movement of the arm is blocked, there occurs the illusion that the elbow is 
moving in the manner opposite to the reflex. Especially when the subject can not see his 
stimulated arm, his hand feels to be in a position very different from its actual position. In 
his experiments, Marcel exploited this vibro-tactile illusion of limb position. In particular, 
in one condition subjects undergoing the illusion were asked to move their unseen hand 
to a target position indicated by a light. On some trials, the actual position of the arm was 
such that the agent had to move his arm to the left to reach the target position, while its 
felt illusory position suggested that the arm would have to be moved to the right the reach 
it. Subjects were asked (a) to draw with their other hand the movement they had to make 
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to reach the target location (pre-movement drawing), (2) to move their unseen arm to the 
target location, (3) to draw with their free hand the movement they had just made (post-
movement drawing). Quite interestingly, pre-movement-drawing always followed the 
illusion, i.e., picturing the movement to be made as a displacement towards the right; the 
actual movement was always to the left showing no sensitivity to the illusion; in post-
movement drawings, 60 to 70 % of the subjects drew the movement in the same direction 
as their pre-movement drawing, suggesting that they had not noticed the difference 
between the movement they thought they had to make and the movement they had 
actually performed.  
The fact that a majority of subjects in this experiment failed to notice this huge 
discrepancy between their predicted visual trajectory and their proprioceptive 
reafferences makes it doubtful that in Jeannerod's experiments the change of strategy of 
the subjects stemmed mainly from their noticing a much smaller discrepancy between 
vision and proprioception. A further difference between Jeannerod's and Marcel's 
experiments is that Marcel's subjects had no visual feedback, thus no way of comparing 
their visual predictions regarding the trajectory of their arm with visual reafferences and 
no way of noticing the discrepancy between the two kinds of signals. The nature of the 
tasks in both experiments may explain why proprioceptive feedback was neglected. In 
both cases, the action was directed at external goals in the form of visual targets. These 
actions where the primary aim is to achieve an external goal are to be contrasted with 
actions where the primary task is to make a movement. Experimental results from 
Wohlschläger et al. (2003) suggest that for the former type of action our experience of 
acting is essentially outward-looking and dependent on information in exteroceptive 
modalities, both in the form of predictions and feedback, while for the latter type of 
actions proprioceptive information plays a crucial role. 
In a nutshell, our awareness of our movements rests for the most part on our 
awareness of the predictions made at the level of P-intentions and on the comparison 
between these predictions and consciously available exteroceptive feedback. When the 
action unfolds smoothly, this awareness is typically extremely limited. Action-
specification and action control mechanisms at the level of M-intentions operate 
automatically and remain outside the subject's subjective experience. When the signals 
this system uses to specify movement parameters and control execution are too discrepant 
for errors to be automatically corrected, failure becomes salient and control is passed 
back to the level of P-intentions. Thus, how-awareness typically becomes more vivid and 
more detailed when we are confronted with action errors too large to be automatically 
corrected. 
5. Sense of agency 
At first blush, it may appear strange to consider separately the question of awareness of 
action and of sense of agency for our actions, where the sense of agency is defined as the 
sense that one is the author of that action. Indeed, philosophers often assume that that 
there is a constitutive link between the agent's awareness of an action and a sense of 
agency and hold a claim of immunity to error through misidentification for the self as 
agent. They assume either that our awareness of action includes the agent of the action as 
part of its content or that the identity of the agent is guaranteed by the mode of access we 
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have to the content of actions, where introspective as opposed to observational access to 
the content of an action would guarantee that the action is indeed ours. Yet, empirical 
evidence suggests that although awareness of action and sense of agency normally go 
together, they can sometimes come apart. The most striking illustrations are delusions of 
alien control in schizophrenia where a subject is aware of the content of the action she is 
executing but denies being the agent of this action. For instance, patients experiencing 
alien control will report: 
"My fingers pick up the pen, but I don't control them. What they do is nothing to do 
with me." (From Mellors, 1970: 18) 
Or: 
"I felt like an automaton, guided by a female spirit who had entered me during it 
[an arm movement]." (From Spence et al. 1997). 
Such dissociations between awareness of action and sense of agency can also occur in 
non-pathological conditions. Wegner's experiments, for instance, suggest that illusions of 
control—where we experience a sense of agency for actions someone else is doing—and 
illusions of action projections—where we de not experience a sense of agency for 
something we are doing—can be induced in normal subjects (Wegner, 2002). 
These data suggest that to give an account of action awareness is not yet to give 
an account of the sense of agency. Before proposing my own account, I discuss three 
approaches to the sense of agency one finds in the recent literature.  
5.1. Proprioceptive awareness 
According to the first approach, the primary source of the sense of agency is the sensory 
modality carrying the information about the action. Exteroceptive perceptual modalities, 
such as vision or audition, carry information about both our actions and the actions of 
others. In contrast, information gained through proprioception is guaranteed to be about 
our actions. Thus, awareness of the modality through which we are informed of an action 
would give us the identity of the agent. If by proprioception, it must be oneself. They are 
problems though with this account of the sense of agency in terms of proprioceptive 
awareness. First, as we already saw, it seems that we have little proprioceptive awareness 
of actions where the primary aim is to achieve an external goal as opposed to actions 
where the primary aim is to make a movement. Thus, this approach in terms of 
proprioceptive awareness may perhaps account for our sense of agency for the latter kind 
of actions, but it is doubtful it would generalize to all actions. Of course, in actions 
directed at achieving an external goal, we may still have some proprioceptive awareness 
that we are moving, but this awareness would presumably be too coarse-grained to be 
matched to a specific action. Suppose, for instance, I am visually attending to someone 
else's action while acting myself, it is unclear which of these two actions my coarse-
grained proprioceptive awareness that I am moving should give me a sense of agency for. 
Second, schizophrenic agents experiencing delusions of control do not deny, say, that 
their arm that is moving, what they deny is being the agent of that action. In other words, 
they do not deny a sense of ownership of the movement, but they deny a sense of 
authorship of the action. This suggests that proprioceptive awareness may underlie the 
sense of ownership for movements, but may not be sufficient for a sense of authorship of 
PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ 
PSYCHE 2007: VOLUME 13 ISSUE 1 14 
actions, in other words for a sense of agency.7 Proprioception may not even be necessary 
for the sense of agency. As Marcel (2003) points out, this is shown by the case of Ian 
Waterman, reported by Cole (Cole, 1993; Cole & Paillard, 1995). Through a peripheral 
neuropathy, IW is completely deafferented below the neck and hence deprived of all 
proprioceptive experience beneath the neck. When he does something, he cannot tell 
without visual feedback the disposition of his limbs and body, yet he knows that he has 
acted. 
Instead of seeing proprioceptive awareness as underlying the sense of agency for 
one's action, one could be tempted to take the opposite view and to argue, as Frith (2005) 
does, that lack of proprioceptive awareness could be a possible indicator that I am 
performing a voluntary act. Numerous studies have shown that the perceptual 
consequences of self-generated actions are attenuated (Blakemore et al., 1998; 1999, 
2000, 2002; Claxton, 1975; Collins et al., 1998). Blakemore and colleagues suggest that 
proprioceptive feedback is attenuated during voluntary movements through forward 
modeling. The idea is that we can predict the feedback we will receive on the basis of the 
motor commands we are preparing to issue and use these predictions to filter incoming 
sensory information and thus attenuate self-produced sensory stimulation. One important 
line of evidence in favor of this view are their extensive studies of the phenomenon of 
self-tickling (Blakemore et al., 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) that show that tickling sensations 
are attenuated both phenomenologically and physiologically and that the amount of 
attenuation is proportional to the spatial and temporal congruence of the predicted and 
actual feedback. However, a recent study by Tsakiris and Haggard (2003) shows that 
sensory attenuation is present whenever an effect is self-generated even when the motor 
system cannot accurately predict the details of the sensory consequences of the performed 
action. Tsakiris and Haggard (2003, 2005) therefore suggest that the sensory attenuation 
of self-generated effects could have two complementary sources: The generation of 
efference would be sufficient to produce an attenuation of subsequent sensory effects by a 
fixed amount and then detailed predictions of sensory consequences made by forward 
models, when available, would yield a further attenuation of sensory effects in a 
proportional manner.  
Lack of proprioceptive experience may, as Frith suggests, contribute to the sense 
of agency for an action. Yet, it can't be the main index that an agent is engaged in 
voluntary action, for presumably we also lack proprioceptive experience when we are 
neither actively moving nor being passively moved.  
5.2. Awareness of intentions 
A second possible approach to the sense of agency is in terms of awareness of intentions. 
Both Humphrey (1992) and Wegner (2002) argue that the sense of agency8 is inferred 
from the existence of a match between a prior intention and an observed action. Frith's 
early account of alien control in schizophrenia (Frith, 1987, 1992) went along similar 
lines. The main components of his account were a distinction between two kinds of 
intentions — stimulus intentions (i.e., unconscious intentions automatically triggered by a 
stimulus and willed intentions (i.e., conscious intentions based on internal plans and 
goals) —, together with a distinction between two levels of monitoring. At the lower 
level, action-monitoring involved using efference-copying mechanisms to distinguish 
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between changes due to our actions and changes due to external factors. At the higher 
level, intention-monitoring involved a comparison of willed intentions with executed 
actions. His account of alien control posited the existence of a deficit in intention-
monitoring resulting in the loss of awareness of ‘willed’ intentions to act. The main 
difference between Frith's account and Humphrey's and Wegner's lies in the fact that for 
Frith the comparison between intention and action is done subpersonally with only its 
result being consciously available in the form of a sense of agency for the action.  
There are two main problems with this approach. First, as several commentators 
(Marcel, 2003; Pacherie, 1996, 2001; Spence, 2001) have pointed out, prior intentions or 
awareness thereof do not seem to be necessary for the sense of agency. On many 
occasions, we cannot remember what our prior intentions were and yet do not disown the 
actions. Furthermore, many of our actions, impulsive, routine or automatic, are not 
preceded by conscious intentions and yet we own them. Second, awareness of an 
intention and of a match between intention and action does not seem sufficient for a sense 
of agency. As Frith himself later acknowledged, the idea that experiences of alien control 
arise through a lack of awareness of intended actions "is inconsistent with the patients' 
ability to follow the commands of the experimenter, to avoid showing utilization 
behavior, and to correct errors on the basis of sensory feedback about limb positions 
(which requires comparisons of intended actions and their consequences)" (Frith et al. 
2000: 1784). Similarly, as Nahmias (2005) points out, Wegner's three conditions of 
priority, consistency and exclusivity between conscious intentions and actions can be 
met, without one thereby experiencing oneself as the agent of the action.  
5.3. Intentional binding 
On the approach just discussed the sense of agency arises primarily when there is match 
between a prior intention and an observed action. Yet, they are other types of matches 
that may be worth considering. One such match is between an action and its 
consequences. Haggard and colleagues (Haggard & al., 2002; Haggard & Clark, 2003) 
have shown that when a voluntary act (a button press) causes an effect (a tone), the 
perceived time of initiating the act is closer to the perceived time of the effect. 
Specifically, the action (the button press) is shifted forwards in time towards the effect it 
produces, while the effect is shifted backwards in time towards the action that produces 
it. Haggard points out that this phenomenon, which he calls intentional binding, depends 
critically on the intention to produce the effect. When similar movements and auditory 
effects occur involuntarily rather than by the subject's intention, the binding effect is 
reversed and cause and effect are perceived as further apart in time than they actually are.  
Haggard suggests that intentional binding is best explained in terms of predictive 
mechanisms of action control: it depends on efferent signals since it does not occur with 
passive movements and it causes anticipatory awareness of action effects, a shift that 
suggests prediction. On this predictive account, the conscious experience of action would 
be constructed at the time of the action itself, as an immediate by-product of the motor 
control circuits that generate and control the physical movement itself. Haggard and 
Clark (2003) tested their predictive account by using TMS to insert occasional 
involuntary movements of the right finger at a time when the subject was intended to 
press the button, but had not yet done so. They found that if the intention was interrupted 
PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ 
PSYCHE 2007: VOLUME 13 ISSUE 1 16 
by an imposed involuntary movement causing the button press, followed by the tone, 
intentional binding did not occur. These results show that an intention followed by the 
appropriate effect is not sufficient for intentional binding and appear incompatible with a 
reconstructive account of the sense of agency of the type favored by Wegner, where the 
existence of a match between intention and action is enough for the agent to 
retrospectively infer that he was the source of the action.  
Although the intentional binding of an action and its effects may underlie the 
experience of intentionality or intentional causation for an action, it is unclear whether, as 
Haggard and Clark (2003) seem to suggest, an experience of intentional causation for an 
action is tantamount to an experience that I caused this effect and am therefore the author 
of that action. Evidence that it may not be so comes from further experimental work 
using the same paradigm. In a series of studies Wohlschläger et al. (2003) showed that 
this binding effect and the associated sense of intentional causation also occur when we 
observe other people's actions. Subjects had to estimate the onset time of button press that 
they executed themselves or that they observed being executed by someone else or else 
by a mechanical device. The estimate of the machine actions was always different from 
those of self- and other-generated actions, whereas the latter two were indistinguishable. 
Subjects had slightly delayed awareness of the onset of their own actions and of the 
experimenter's action, showing in both cases a binding effect, but an anticipatory 
awareness of the machine's action.  
These surprising findings need not be inconsistent with the predictive account of 
intentional binding favored by Haggard, provided one assumes that the predictive 
mechanisms used for action control also operate when one observes someone else acting.9 
If, however, intentional binding is not linked to a particular person, it cannot be the basis 
of the sense of authorship for an action. Intentional binding of action and effect would 
seem to be associated with the agent-neutral experience of intentional causation, rather 
than with the experience of authorship per se. Frith (2005) points out that if the two kinds 
of experience are distinct, then it should be possible for one to be impaired while the 
other remains intact. Indeed he suggests that a patient with delusions of control may 
experience a strong sense of intentional causation for an action he has just performed 
while lacking a sense of authorship for that action.10 This dissociation of the two 
experiences may indeed form the basis of an explanation of delusions of control. It is 
unclear, however, whether the reverse dissociation could occur, with someone feeling a 
strong sense of authorship for an action in the absence of an experience of intentional 
causation. If indeed there are no dissociations of this latter type, the experience of 
intentional causation associated with intentional binding, although not sufficient to 
generate an experience of authorship for an action, may still be a necessary component of 
that experience. 
In pointing out the limitations of these three approaches just discussed I did not 
mean to deny that proprioceptive awareness, awareness of a match between a prior 
intention and an action, or intentional binding can contribute to the sense of agency one 
normally feels for one's actions. Rather, I want to suggest that some further processes 
involved in the preparation and control of action may play a more crucial role. This is the 
approach I will now pursue. The two contributors I have in mind are sense of initiation 
and sense of control.  
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5.4. Sense of initiation 
According to Frith, Blakemore and Wolpert's revised account of delusions of alien 
control (Frith et al. 2000; Blakemore et al. 2002, 2003; Frith, 2005), in normal 
circumstances when an agent is performing an action, she is aware of (i) her goal, (ii) her 
intention to move, (iii) her movement having occurred, and (iv) her having initiated her 
movement. In contrast, a patient with delusions of control has normal awareness of (i)-
(iii) but not of (iv).11 According to this revised model, awareness of initiating a 
movement depends on awareness of the predicted sensory consequences of the 
movement. This view is based on evidence that awareness of initiating a movement in 
healthy subjects is reported by the agent between 80-200 ms before the movement 
actually occurs (Libet et al., 1983; Libet, 1985).  
In experiments extending Libet's work, Haggard and colleagues (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999; Haggard & Magno, 1999) confirmed that both intention judgments 
corresponding to awareness of an intention to move and movement judgments 
corresponding to the awareness of movement onset preceded actual movement, but they 
also showed that both types of judgments were unrelated to the general readiness 
potential but covaried with the lateralized readiness potential.12 This suggests that 
awareness of an intention is tied not to the general aspects of action preparation but to the 
selection of a specific motor program. This also suggests that both awareness of intention 
and awareness of movements are associated with pre-motor processes rather than motor 
processes themselves. In another experiment using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
(TMS), Haggard and Magno (1999) showed that applying TMS over the primary motor 
cortex created a large delay of the actual reaction time (movement onset) but a much 
smaller delay of the time of awareness of movement, whereas applying TMS over pre-
motor areas, specifically the SMA, led to a much smaller delay of actual reaction time but 
to a greater delay in the awareness of movement. These data support the view that 
awareness of movement onset is generated upstream of the primary motor cortex but 
downstream of the pre-motor structures. Interestingly, in another study investigating 
altered awareness of voluntary action after damage to the parietal cortex, Sirigu and 
colleagues (Sirigu et al., 2004) showed that patients with parietal damage could report 
when they started moving but not when they first became aware of their intention to 
move. This is consistent with independent evidence that the parietal cortex is important in 
activating and maintaining internal models used to predict the future outcome of a given 
action (Sirigu et al., 1996; Desmurget & Grafton, 2000).  
As Haggard (2005) suggests, the subjective experience of conscious intention 
often contains two components: a sense of urge, of being about to move, and a reference 
forward to the goal object or event. One might speculate that awareness of intention 
depends on activity in the SMA for its first aspect and on parietal processing for the 
second, while awareness of movement would not depend on parietal activity but have its 
source in premotor processing in the SMA. As Haggard (2003) points out, the co-
existence of awareness of intention and awareness of movement onset within a single 
narrow window of premotor processing suggests that binding these two representations 
may be important. In particular, the efferent binding of these two representations may 
underlie the sense of initiation for the action, where the sense of initiation is not just the 
sense that we started moving, but the sense that we started moving in accordance with our 
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intention. It is important to note that the efferent binding at stake here is not the 
intentional binding discussed in section 5.3. What I suggested earlier is that the 
intentional binding of an action (movement onset) and its consequences gives rise to the 
experience of intentional causation; what I am suggesting here is that the binding of 
intention and movement onset gives rise to the experience of action initiation. One should 
further note that this proposal differs in two important ways from the proposals of 
Wegner, Frith and Humphrey discussed earlier. First, the representations that are bound 
are not representations of a prior conscious intention (F-intention) and of an observed 
action, but of an immediate intention (P-intention) and of its internally predicted 
consequences. Second, this binding is not a post-hoc reconstruction but a preconstruction.  
5.5. Sense of control 
Although the sense of initiation may be a crucial component of the sense of agency for an 
action, it doesn't seem to offer the guarantee that the whole action will be owned by the 
subject. For instance, we may sometime feel that we initiated an action but do not control 
its course. If something unforeseen happens, the action may get out of hand so to speak. 
We may feel we've lost control over it and this feeling may result in a reduction or even 
abolition of the sense of agency for the action. Similarly, it is unclear whether the 
experience of alien control in schizophrenia is always associated with a lack of sense of 
initiation for the action. In the patient's report from Spence et al. (1997) I quoted earlier, 
the patient described his experience as follows: "I felt like an automaton, guided by a 
female spirit who had entered me during it [an arm movement]" (my emphasis). This 
suggests that the experience of alien control for an action may sometime appear after the 
action has started. Some experimental data provide further evidence for this possibility. 
Thus, in an experiment where they had to move a cursor on a computer screen, some 
schizophrenic patients had a normal sense of agency while the cursor was visible but 
experienced a strong sense of alien control when visual feedback was withdrawn, the 
cursor in effect moving behind an opaque obstacle on the screen (Jouvent, personal 
communication). 
The sense of control may therefore be another crucial contributor to the normal 
sense of agency for an action. Yet, it is doubtful whether the experience of control is 
itself a simple, elementary phenomenon. It seems rather that the sense of control can take 
different forms and varies along several dimensions and should be conceived as a 
compound of more basic, partly dissociable experiences. First, it should be noticed that 
talk of sense of control for an action can refer to two rather different kinds of experience. 
On the one hand, it may refer to the extent to which one feels in control of an action, 
where at one extreme everything happens exactly as expected and the agent feels in full 
control of his action and at the other everything goes astray and the agent feels 
completely powerless. On the other hand, by sense of control we may refer to the sense 
that one has to exert control to generate and maintain an appropriate action program 
despite perturbating factors. Normally control in this latter sense is felt as effortful: the 
more one has to exert control to attain one's goal, the more effortful the action feels.  
Second, according to the model of action specification and control I described in 
section 2, intentions at each of the three levels I distinguished exert their own specific 
form of control and guidance over the action. Control and guidance at the level of F-
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intentions must ensure that the successive steps in the action plan are implemented. They 
must also ensure that the adjustments and corrections that may have to be made while the 
action unfolds lead to the attainment of the overall goal and do not flout the rationality 
and consistency constraints on which the action was premised. P-intentions anchor action 
plans both in time and in the situation of action. Control and guidance at this level must 
take into account the characteristics of the agent, the target of action and the surrounding 
context at the time of action. Actions are represented in terms of motor programs and of 
the perceptual consequences of their execution. Guidance and control consist in ensuring 
that the motor program is implemented and, if necessary, in adjusting it so it yields the 
expected perceptual consequences. Finally, M-intentions specify the detailed parameters 
of the selected motor program. Motor control processes are responsible for the fast online 
adjustment and fine-tuning of these parameters. We may therefore speak of rational 
control at the level of F-intentions, situational control at the level of P-intentions and 
motor control at the level of M-intentions.  
The experimental evidence we discussed in section 4.2 suggests that motor 
control at the level of M-intentions is automatic and that typically subjects are not aware 
of the nature of the adjustments and corrections made at this level. It is only when the 
discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory consequences of the movements 
becomes too large to be automatically corrected that it becomes accessible to 
consciousness. This suggests that the sensorimotor signals used for motor control could 
contribute something to the experience of control. This contribution would, however, be 
limited in two ways: first, sensorimotor signals would only contribute to the experience 
of control when large discrepancies are present and, second, these signals would only 
modulate the extent to which one feels in control of the action but would not tell us the 
aspects in which the action escapes our full control. 
At the level of P-intentions, the sense that one is in control would rely on the 
perceived match or mismatch between the predicted perceptual effects, corresponding to 
the situated goal, and the actual perceptual effects; while at the level of F-intention, it 
would depend on whether our action plan is carried out successfully, in other words on 
the conceptual match between the predicted and actual consequences of its successive 
steps. At both levels, the better the match the more one feels in control. Yet, it is 
important to note that these two forms of the sense that one is in control—conceptual and 
rational at the level of F-intentions, perceptual and situational at the level of P-
intentions—can come apart. Perfect situational control over one's motor action will not 
guarantee the achievement of the overarching goal if the action plan was badly thought 
out in the first place and, conversely, one's general goal may be achieved despite 
approximate situational control. 
The sense that one is in control is therefore often, I suggest, a compound of three 
more basic experiences: the sense of motor control, the sense of situational control and 
the sense of rational control. In all three cases, the degree to which one feels in control 
depends on a comparison between predicted and actual states, where the better the match 
the stronger the sense of control. One important difference between motor control on the 
one hand and situational and rational control on the other is that when one doesn't feel in 
full motor control one is simply aware that something is wrong, whereas when one's 
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doesn't feel in full situational or rational control one can be aware not just that something 
is wrong but of what is wrong. 
When something is wrong, one normally feels one has to exert control to keep the 
action on track. The type of control one has to exert depends on the nature of the 
perturbating factors. Perturbations may be due to external or to internal factors, may be 
physical or not, may have been anticipated or not, and may affect motor, situational or 
rational control. Depending on their nature, resistance to perturbating factors can require 
either physical or mental effort. For instance, lifting a heavy box requires physical effort, 
reading in a noisy environment requires concentration, and inhibiting a prepotent but 
inappropriate response requires mental effort. When the effect of perturbating factors has 
been anticipated (I know that the box is heavier than it look, that I am in England and 
should drive on the left side of the road, that solving this problem is difficult and requires 
concentration), the amount of force or the attentional resources needed are pre-
programmed and would be part of our awareness of the content of our intention 
immediately prior to action. But when these disturbances are unexpected, the sense that 
one has to exert control would have its origins in signals indicating a discrepancy 
between predicted and actual state and in the corrections and adjustments these signals 
would trigger.  
Typically, although not always, the more one feels one is in control the less one 
feels one has to exert control and vice-versa. Yet, I think it would be a mistake to 
dispense with one of these two notions in favor of the other, for they seem to make rather 
different contributions to the sense of agency. Nahmias (2005) remarks that the 
phenomenology of effortless control is complex and somewhat ambiguous. A feeling of 
effortless control can sometimes give rise to a heightened sense of one's agency and 
sometimes involve a reduced sense of agency. One way to make sense of this ambiguity 
is in terms of the distinction between the feeling that one is in control and the feeling that 
one has to exert control. We typically experience a feeling of effortless control when we 
achieve a perfect match between action and goal without having to go through corrections 
or adjustments. So in a way our sense of agency is heightened since the performed action 
fully conforms to our intention. Yet, at the same time, in such actions we meet with no 
resistance, either internal or external, and do not experience the kind of contrast between 
what we want and what the world will allow that would sharpen our sense of self. In 
contrast, in actions where we meet with resistance and have to overcome perturbations, 
the actual consequences of our actions do not match our predictions perfectly and in that 
respect we don't feel that what we did was exactly what we wanted to do. Yet, at the same 
time, our awareness of the efforts we have to make to try and keep the action on track 
heighten our sense that we are indeed engaged in action.13  
Interestingly, executive control and feeling of mental effort are dissociable. 
Naccache and colleagues (Naccache et al., 2005) report the case of a woman with a left 
mesio-frontal cortex lesion including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). This patient, 
RMB, and a group of comparison subjects, were tested on a Stroop task, where subjects 
have to respond according to the ink color of a color world. In congruent trials, the ink 
color and the word itself refer to the same response; in incongruent trials the subject has 
to focus his executive attention to select the relevant information (ink color) and to inhibit 
the prepotent response associated with the irrelevant information (the printed color word). 
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In normal patients, response times are slower for incongruent trials where the ink color 
and the color word don't match, they report feelings of subjective effort and these feelings 
correlate with higher skin-conductance responses (SCRs). In contrast, RMB experienced 
no conscious feeling of mental effort and showed no heightened SCR, despite exhibiting 
normal executive control. Yet she understood the task. For instance, commenting on an 
incongruent trial she said: "Yes, this one was a tricky trial, with ink opposite to the word, 
thus it should be more difficult to me; however, I do not feel any sensation of difficulty 
here." (Naccache et al., 2005: 1323). Naccache and colleagues note that this lack of 
consciousness of mental effort coincides with a lack of bodily-mediated physiological 
responses indexing mental effort in healthy subjects. They suggest that the lesion 
prevented the residual activity of the right ACC, which still varied with the requirements 
for executive attention, from signaling internal changes in executive recruitment to the 
left-ventral-mesial prefrontal region known to be involved in the generation of somatic 
markers. On this view, the feeling of conscious effort would be a by-product of executive 
attention, but would not play a causal role in its deployment. Yet, Naccache and 
colleagues do not mean to argue that subjective feelings accompanying voluntary actions 
are completely epiphenomenal. RMB demonstrated a pattern of impaired behavior and 
SCRs in the Iowa gambling task devised by Bechara et al. (2000) suggesting that her 
absence of subjective feelings affected her decision-making and made her unable to 
progressively select the advantageous decks of cards.  
To recap, the account I propose of the sense of control and its contribution to the 
sense of agency is as follows. The degree to which one feels in control of an action is the 
weighted result of comparisons between predicted and actual states made at three levels 
of action control—motor control, situational control and rational control—where 
comparisons at different levels may sometime pull in different directions. The degree to 
which one feels one has to exert control over an action depends on the amount of 
adjustments and corrections one has to make to reduce the discrepancies between 
predictions and outcomes created by perturbations of various kinds. Control in this latter 
sense is normally felt as effortful, where the effort can be either mental or physical. 
Feeling that one is in control may heighten the sense of agency for a given action insofar 
as the result achieved fully conforms to the agent's intention, while feeling that one has to 
exert control over an action may heighten the sense that one is engaged in action, despite 
there being no perfect match between what is achieved and how and what was initially 
intended.  
One may object to this account that it takes things from the wrong end.14 It claims 
that the sense of control for an action depends on comparisons between predicted states 
and actual states at various levels of action specification. This is in effect a kind of 
bottom-up account. One may want to claim instead that our beliefs about what we can or 
cannot control as well as information about other possible explanations of how some 
effects are produced may lead us to infer that we control an action or that we don't. 
According to this top-down alternative to the account defended here, rather than the sense 
of control stemming from comparisons between predicted states and actual states, our 
prior beliefs about control would influence the comparisons we make. 
One line of evidence that may be thought to favor this alternative view comes 
from work in developmental psychology. Schultz et al. (1980) used a reflex hammer to 
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induce a knee-jerk reflex in children. The children were then asked whether they had 
meant to move their leg. Three-year-olds said that they had meant to move their leg but 
five-year-olds denied it correctly. Lang and Perner (2002) reproduced these results and 
also showed that performance on the knee-jerk reflex task strongly correlates with 
performance on the false-belief task and on two executive function tasks (card sorting 
task and hand game) where one has to inhibit interfering action tendencies.  
The objection to the account I defend in this paper goes something like that. The 
question "Did you mean to move your leg?" translates as "Did you control the movement 
of your leg?" On my account, to answer this question, one should consult one's 
phenomenology so to speak. If the subject experienced a sense of control for the 
movement, she should say that she meant it; otherwise, she should say that she didn't 
mean it. If this is how things are, the account has no ready explanation why three-year-
olds are not able to answer correctly and five-year old are, for presumably both groups of 
children enjoy the same phenomenology. In contrast, on the alternative top-down 
account, the performance of the children in the knee-jerk reflex task can be explained in 
terms of their theoretical beliefs about movements. The older children have acquired, 
while the younger children still lack, beliefs about the difference between reflex 
movements and other movements. In particular, the older children have acquired the 
belief that reflex movements are movements they can't control and are thus in a position 
to infer that they did not mean to move their leg, while the younger children haven't yet 
acquired the beliefs that would support this inference. 
There is, however, a third, altogether more plausible, explanation of the 
performance of younger children on that task. Namely, the reason the younger children 
fail the task is that they have yet to develop a sufficient mastery of the concepts of 
intention and intentional action. Indeed, there is clear evidence, summarized in Astington 
(2001), that children do no really understand the distinction between desire and intention 
until they are four or five years old. For instance, younger children will tend to say that an 
accidental action was intended if its outcome satisfies a desire they have. They have an 
appreciation of desires and their relation to actions but they still lack an appreciation of 
the role of intentions as causal mediators between desires and actions and their outcomes.  
One may want to argue that an appreciation of the causal role of intentions is also 
what is needed to distinguish between ownership and authorship of movements. Children 
who lack this appreciation would tend to treat the questions "Did your leg move?", "Did 
you move your leg?", and "Did you mean to move your leg?" as synonymous. On this 
view, passing the knee-jerk reflex task does not require the acquisition of theoretical 
beliefs about movements and their control, but a more developed understanding of 
intentions and their role. It may be as Astington (2001) and Lang and Perner (2002) 
would argue, and as the correlation between performance on the knee-jerk reflex task and 
on the false belief task suggests, that such an understanding depends on the development 
of metarepresentational abilities. It may also be, as Russell (1996) and I (Pacherie, 1997) 
have argued, and as the correlation between performance on the knee-jerk reflex task and 
on executive function tasks suggests, that such an understanding depends on the 
development of executive control. The idea is that for children to develop an 
understanding of the specific causal role of intentions, their intentions should indeed play 
this role, something that depends on the development of executive control.  
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The important point here is that, on either view, successful performance on the knee-jerk 
reflex task does not depend on the acquisition of beliefs about movements and their 
control but on the development of an understanding of the role of intentions. It is only 
once this understanding is secured, that children can translate the question they are asked 
as "Did you have the intention to move your leg and did this intention cause and control 
the movement of your leg?" and can start looking for experiential cues that will help them 
answer it. Both views are therefore compatible with a bottom-up account of sense of 
control. 
I don't think therefore that the existing developmental evidence supports the view 
that the sense of control is primarily the result of a theoretical inference that would then 
influence comparisons. There are, however, two things to be said in favor of top-down 
effects. First, the phenomenology of action in general and the experience of control in 
particular are often thin and elusive, with minimal, ephemeral conscious content. Top-
down influences may therefore enhance otherwise elusive experiences through a process 
of attentional amplification. Thus, in younger children the constituent elements of the 
experience of control may already be present and yet go unnoticed, while older children 
with a better grasp of the concept of intention may attend to their experience, thus 
increasing its salience. Note though that younger children also have limited executive 
function abilities, hence a limited control over their actions and presumably a reduced 
experience of control. There is also a second way in which top-down effects may 
influence the sense of control. As both philosophers and psychologists have argued 
(Brand, 1984; Bratman, 1987; Davidson, 1980; Moses, 2001), besides a motivational and 
a causal aspect, intentions also have an epistemic aspect. An intention to perform an 
action normally entails a belief that one will perform the action. There are divergences as 
to the exact form such beliefs should take and how strong they should be, but there is at 
least a consensus that I cannot intend what I positively believe that I can't do. Thus it 
seems that beliefs about what we can and cannot control might influence not just our 
intention-formation processes but also our interpretation of what we actually do. In the 
absence of unambiguous experiences of motor and situational control, whether or not I 
experience control for an action may well depend on my prior beliefs about control. This, 
however, doesn't make these beliefs the primary determinants of my sense of control for 
an action; rather they would provide auxiliary sources of information used for 
disambiguation. 
6. Conclusion 
What I tried to do in the paper is show that there are important connections between 
processes of action-specification and control and various aspects of the phenomenology 
of action. My main focus was on the sense of agency and I tried to explore its main 
components. I argued that the sense of intentionality or intentional causation—that relies 
on the efferent binding of an action and its effect—is probably a necessary component of 
the sense of agency but is clearly not a sufficient mark of self-agency in so far as it 
appears to be agent-neutral. I also argued that another form of efferent binding, between 
intention and movement onset, may underlie the sense of initiation for an action and play 
a more important contribution to the sense of authorship or an action. Finally, although 
the sense of initiation may be a crucial component of the sense of agency for an action, it 
doesn't seem to offer the guarantee that the whole action will be owned by the subject. A 
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sense of control seems to be also required. I tried to show that the global sense of control 
for a given action is a compound of three more basic experiences: the sense of motor 
control, the sense of situational control and the sense of rational control, each resulting 
from comparisons between predicted states and actual states at a given level of action 
specification and control. These more basic experiences are partly dissociable and may 
contribute differentially according to the nature of the action—for instance whether it is 
skilled or not, preceded by a conscious intention or not. One of the other approaches to 
the sense of agency I briefly discussed emphasizes the existence of a match between a 
prior conscious intention and an observed action. In my view, this match is but one of the 
elements contributing to the sense of control and not the most crucial one at that. Indeed, 
I concur with Haggard's view (Haggard, 2005) that the sense of agency should be seen as 
mostly a preconstruction rather than a post-hoc reconstruction 
Although this paper investigated the possible sources of the phenomenology of 
agency, it said next to nothing as to the possible causal role of awareness of action or 
feelings of agency. If, as Wegner sometimes seems to argue (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), 
the processes through which the phenomenology of agency is generated were completely 
separate from the processes involved in action-specification and control, it would indeed 
be unlikely that conscious experience plays a causal role in the production and control of 
action. Arguing that the two sets of processes are linked keeps this option open but 
shouldn't lead one to embrace without qualifications the view that our experience of 
doing in all its aspects systematically plays a role in the production, guidance and control 
of action. Rather than try and defend an all or none view, we should, as the case reported 
by Naccache et al. suggests, be open to the idea that some but not all of processes of 
action production and control depend on conscious experiences and be ready to 
acknowledge the complexity of cognitive-experiential interactions.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Although my F-intentions are somewhat similar to Searle's prior intentions (Searle, 
1983), one crucial aspect in which they differ is that I do not conceive of F-intentions as 
ending with the onset of the corresponding body movements. Note though that Searle 
(2004) withdrew his earlier claim that the role of prior intentions is over once movement 
starts. 
2 I borrow this useful distinction between two forms of rational control, tracking and 
collateral control, from Buekens, Maesen and Vanmechelen (2001). 
3 Some of the confusion surrounding recent discussions of the exact nature of the 
impairment underlying delusions of control in patients with schizophrenia could probably 
be avoided by explicitly distinguishing between the predictions made by forward models 
at the level of P- and M-intentions. For a discussion, see Pacherie et al., in press. 
4 For an approach of long-term agency along these lines, see for instance Velleman 
(2006) 
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5 The mode of response used in this experiment (indicating a line on a chart) may be 
thought to have induced a bias and to have led the subjects to base their report on visual 
cues. Yet, in a variant of the experiment, subjects were asked instead to reproduce the 
movement they had made with their eyes closed. This change in the mode of response 
had no effect on their reports. Subjects still adhered to the direction seen on the computer 
screen (Jeannerod, personal communication). 
6 I used to think, together with Jeannerod, that failure of action could result in an 
awareness of motor representations normally outside the agent's subjective experience. 
We speculated that the main reason these representations are not normally consciously 
accessible is that that they are too short-lived. In the case of a successfully executed 
motor act, the content of the motor representation would not reach consciousness because 
it would be cancelled as soon as the corresponding movements were executed (perhaps 
by the incoming signals generated by the execution itself). In contrast, in cases where 
execution is blocked or error corrections fail the representation would be protected from 
cancellation and would become accessible to conscious processing. Yet, whether a 
representation is accessible to consciousness or not may not just be a matter of its 
temporal characteristics but also of its representational format. It is therefore doubtful 
whether sensori-motor representations as such can in principle be accessible to 
consciousness. 
7 It would be interesting to know whether schizophrenic patients experience delusions of 
control primarily for actions directed at an external goal or primarily for actions aimed at 
making a movement. I am aware of no data bearing on that issue, but such data would 
presumably give us some indication on the contribution, important or not, proprioception 
makes to the sense of agency.  
8 Note that they use a different terminology. Humphrey uses the term 'sense of ownership' 
while Wegner speaks of 'the experience of conscious will'.  
9 Indeed, there is increasing evidence that common brain circuits are used both to control 
one's actions and to represent observed actions performed by others. This evidence ranges 
from single-cell recordings studies in monkeys, where mirror neurons were discovered 
that fire both during goal-directed action and observation of actions performed by another 
individual (see Fogassi & Gallese, 2002 for a review) to functional neuroimaging 
experiments in humans (see Blakemore & Decety, 2001 and Grèzes & Decety, 2001, for 
reviews). 
10 Note that although we exploit the same distinctions, Frith's terminological choices 
differ from mine. What I call the experience of intentional causation, he calls the 
experience of agency or intentionality; what I call the sense of agency or authorship, he 
calls the experience of ownership or of being in control of an action.  
11 For a more detailed discussion of Frith's revised model and its possible limitations, see 
Jeannerod & Pacherie (2004) and Pacherie et al. (2006). 
12 Intention judgments correspond to what Libet, and Haggard following Libet, call W-
judgments, and movement judgments to what they call M-judgments. The intention one is 
aware of when making a W-judgment is what I would call a P-intention.  
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13 Another variable of interest in explaining the peculiar phenomenology of effortless 
control may be the focus of attention of the agent. In particular, it would be worth 
exploring whether there is a correlation between the feelings of heightened as opposed to 
reduced agency for effortless actions and the inward-looking (movement of the body) or 
outward-looking (external goal) nature of the action. 
14 I am grateful to Joshua Knobe for drawing my attention to this objection.  
